

# Lecture 4

## Encryption Continued...

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## *Data Encryption Standard (DES)*

- 64 bit input block
- 64 bit output block
- 16 rounds
- 64 (effective 56) bit key
- Key schedule computed at startup
- Aimed at bulk data
- >16 rounds doesn't help
- >56 bit key doesn't help
- Other S-boxes usually hurt...

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





Figure 2.3 General Depiction of DES Encryption Algorithm




## Function F



## DES Substitution Boxes Operation





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Key schedule of shifts

Iteration(i)	No. of shifts
1	1
2	1
3	2
4	2
5	2
6	2
7	2
8	2
9	1
10	2
11	2
12	2
13	2
14	2
15	2
16	1

Key permutation PC-1

57	49	41	33	25	17	9
1	58	50	42	34	26	18
10	2	59	51	43	35	27
19	11	3	60	52	44	36
63	55	47	39	31	23	15
7	62	54	46	38	30	22
14	6	61	53	45	37	29
21	13	5	28	20	12	4

# Key permutation PC-2

14	17	11	24	1	5
3	28	15	6	20	10
23	19	12	4	26	8
16	7	27	20	13	2
41	52	31	37	47	55
30	40	51	45	33	48
44	49	39	56	34	54
46	42	50	36	29	32

## Operation Tables of DES (Key Schedule, PC-1, PC-2)

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## Operation Tables of DES (IP, IP<sup>-1</sup>, E and P)

Initial Permutation (IP)

58	50	42	34	26	18	10	2
60	52	44	36	28	20	12	4
62	54	46	38	30	22	14	6
64	56	48	40	32	24	16	8
57	49	41	33	25	17	9	1
59	51	43	35	27	19	11	3
61	53	45	37	29	21	13	5
63	55	47	39	31	23	15	7

Bit-Selection Table E

32	1	2	3	4	5
4	5	6	7	8	9
8	9	10	11	12	13
12	13	14	15	16	17
16	17	18	19	20	21
20	21	22	23	24	25
24	25	26	27	28	29
28	29	30	31	32	1

Inverse Initial Permutation (IP<sup>-1</sup>)

40	8	48	16	56	24	64	32
39	7	47	15	55	23	63	31
38	6	46	14	54	22	62	30
37	5	45	13	53	21	61	29
36	4	44	12	52	20	60	28
35	3	43	11	51	19	59	27
34	2	42	10	50	18	58	26
33	1	41	9	49	17	57	25

Permutation P

16	7	20	21
19	12	18	17
1	15	23	26
5	18	31	10
2	8	24	14
32	27	3	9
19	13	30	6
22	11	4	25

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## DES: Modes of Operation

- Electronic code-book (ECB) → Local error, permutation attack, parallel encr.  

$$C_i = E(K, P_i)$$
- Chained block cipher (CBC) Next slide → Need IV, error causes 2-block loss, no parallel encr.  

$$C_i = E(K, C_{i-1} \text{ XOR } P_i)$$
- Output feedback (OFB) → Stream cipher, local error, pre-computation  

$$V_i = E(K, V_{i-1}) \quad C_i = P_i \text{ XOR } V_i$$
- Cipher feedback (CFB) → Plaintext dependence, avalanche effect, parallel decryption.  

$$C_i = P_i \text{ XOR } E(K, C_{i-1})$$

OFB/CFB - encrypt only!
- Message Auth Code (MAC)  

$$P_1, \dots, P_n, C_n \text{ (CBC)}$$

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# CBC Mode

- Cipher Block Chaining Mode (CBC)
  - Input to the encryption algorithm is the XOR of the current plaintext block and the preceding ciphertext block.
  - Repeating pattern of 64-bits are not exposed
  - Block rearrangement made difficult!

$$C_i = E_k[C_{i-1} \oplus P_i]$$

$$D_K[C_i] = D_K[E_K(C_{i-1} \oplus P_i)]$$

$$D_K[C_i] = (C_{i-1} \oplus P_i)$$

$$C_{i-1} \oplus D_K[C_i] = C_{i-1} \oplus C_{i-1} \oplus P_i = P_i$$

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


Figure 2.7 Cipher Block Chaining (CBC) Mode

# Breaking DES (Cryptanalysis)

## Differential Cryptanalysis

- ❖ Looks for correlations in  $f()$ -function input and output

## Linear cryptanalysis

- ❖ Looks for correlations between key and cipher input and output

## Related-key cryptanalysis

- ❖ Looks for correlations between key changes and cipher input/output

Differential cryptanalysis discovered in 1990; virtually all block ciphers from before that time are vulnerable...

...except DES. IBM (and the NSA) knew about it 15 years earlier

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# Breaking DES (Cryptanalysis)

DES Key size = 56 bits

- Brute force =  $2^{55}$  attempts
- Differential cryptanalysis =  $2^{47}$  attempts
- Linear cryptanalysis =  $2^{43}$  attempts

- Longer than 56 bit keys don't make it any stronger
- More than 16 rounds don't make it any stronger
- DES Key Problems:
  - Weak keys (all 0s, all 1s, a few others)
  - Key size = 56 bits =  $8 * 7$ -bit ASCII
  - Alphanumeric-only password converted to uppercase  
 $8 * \sim 5$ -bit chars = 40 bits

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# DES Variants

- 3-DES (triple DES)
  - $C = E(K1, D(K2, E(K1,P)))$  → 112 effective key bits
  - $C = E(K3, D(K2, E(K1,P)))$  → 168 effective key bits
- DESx
  - $C = K3 \text{ XOR } E(K2, (K1 \text{ XOR } P))$  → seems like 184 key bits
  - Effective key bits → approx. 118
- 2-DES:
  - $C = E(K2, E(K1, P))$
- Another simple variation:
  - $C = K1 \text{ XOR } E(K1', P)$  → weak!

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# Lecture 5

Encryption Continued...

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# DES Variants

- 3-DES (triple DES)
  - $C = E(K1, D(K2, E(K1, P))) \rightarrow 112$  effective key bits
  - $C = E(K3, D(K2, E(K1, P))) \rightarrow 168$  effective key bits
- DESx
  - $C = K3 \text{ XOR } E(K2, (K1 \text{ XOR } P)) \rightarrow$  seems like 184 key bits
  - Effective key bits  $\rightarrow$  approx. 118
- 2-DES:
  - $C = E(K2, E(K1, P))$
- Another simple variation:
  - $C = K1 \text{ XOR } E(K1', P) \rightarrow$  weak!

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## Why not 2-DES ?

- 2DES:  $C = \text{DES}(K1, \text{DES}(K2, P))$
- Seems to be hard to break by "brute force", approx.  $2^{111}$  trials
- Assume Eve is trying to break 2DES and has a single  $(P, C)$  pair

### Meet-in-the-middle (or Rendsvouz) ATTACK:

- I. For each possible  $K'_i$  (where  $0 < i < 2^{56}$ )
  1. Compute  $C'_i = \text{DES}(K'_i, P)$
  2. Store:  $[K'_i, C'_i]$  in table T (sorted by  $C'_i$ )
- II. For each possible  $K''_i$  (where  $0 < i < 2^{56}$ )
  1. Compute  $C''_i = \text{DES}^{-1}(K''_i, C)$
  2. Lookup  $C''_i$  in T  $\leftarrow$  not expensive!
  3. If lookup succeeds, output:  $K1=K'_i, K2=K''_i$

**TOTAL COST:  $O(2^{56})$  operations +  $O(2^{56})$  storage** <sup>18</sup>

# DES Variants

- 3-DES (triple DES)
  - $C = E(K1, D(K2, E(K1, P))) \rightarrow 112$  effective key bits
  - $C = E(K3, D(K2, E(K1, P))) \rightarrow 168$  effective key bits
- DESx
  - $C = K3 \text{ XOR } E(K2, (K1 \text{ XOR } P)) \rightarrow$  seems like 184 key bits
  - Effective key bits  $\rightarrow$  approx. 118
- 2-DES:
  - $C = E(K2, E(K1, P)) \rightarrow$  rendezvous (meet-in-the-middle attack)
- Another simple variation:
  - $C = K1 \text{ XOR } E(K1', P) \rightarrow$  weak!

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# DES Variants

Why does 3-DES (or generally n-DES) work?

Because, as a function, DES is not a **group**...

A "group" is an algebraic structure. One of its properties is that, taking any 2 elements of the group (a,b) and applying an operator F() yields another element c in the group.

Suppose:  $C = \text{DES}(K1, \text{DES}(K2, P))$

There is no K, such that:

for each possible plaintext P,  $\text{DES}(K, P) = C$

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## DES summary

- Permutation/substitution block cipher
- 64-bit data blocks
- 56-bit keys (8 parity bits)
- 16 rounds (shifts, XORs)
- Key schedule
- S-box selection secret...
- DES "aging"
- 2-DES: rendezvous attack
- 3-DES: 112-bit security
- DESx : 118-bit security

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## Other Symmetric Ciphers

### Skipjack

- Classified algorithm originally designed for Clipper,
- declassified in 1998
- 32 rounds, breakable with 31 rounds
- 80 bit key, inadequate for long-term security

### GOST

- GOST 28147, Russian answer to DES
- 32 rounds, 256 bit key
- Incompletely specified

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## Other Symmetric Ciphers

- IDEA (X. Lai, J. Massey, ETH)
  - Developed as PES (proposed encryption standard),
  - adapted to resist differential cryptanalysis
  - Gained popularity via PGP, 128 bit key
  - Patented (Ascom CH)
- Blowfish (B. Schneier, Counterpane)
  - Optimized for high-speed execution on 32-bit processors
  - 448 bit key, relatively slow key setup
  - Fast for bulk data on most PCs/laptops
  - Easy to implement, runs in ca. 5K of memory

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## Other Symmetric Ciphers

**RC4 (Ron's Cipher #4) Stream cipher:**

- ❖ Optimized for fast software implementation
- ❖ Character streaming (not bit)
- ❖ 8-bit output
- ❖ Former trade secret of RSA Data Security, Inc.
- ❖ Reverse-engineered and posted to the net in 1994:
- ❖ 2048-bit key
- ❖ Used in many products until about 1999-2000

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## Other Symmetric Ciphers (RC4)

```
x=y=0;
while( length-- )
{
    /* state[0-255] contains key bytes */
    sx = state[ ++x & 0xFF ];
    y += sx & 0xFF;
    sy = state[ y ];
    state[ y ] = sx;
    state[ x ] = sy;
    *data++ ^= state[ ( sx+sy ) & 0xFF ];
}
```

Takes about a minute to implement from memory

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## Other Symmetric Ciphers

- RC5
  - Suitable for hardware and software
  - Fast, simple
  - Adaptable to processors of different word lengths
  - Variable number of rounds
  - Variable-length key (0-256 bytes)
  - Very low memory requirements
  - High security (no effective attacks, yet...)
  - Data-dependent rotations

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## Other Symmetric Ciphers

- RC5 single round pseudocode:

```
 $L \leftarrow L \text{ XOR } R$   
 $L \leftarrow L \ll\ll R$   
 $L \leftarrow L + \text{subkey}[2i]$   
 $R \leftarrow R \text{ XOR } L$   
 $R \leftarrow R \ll\ll L$   
 $R \leftarrow R + \text{subkey}[2i + 1]$ 
```

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AES:  
The Rijndael Block  
Cipher

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# Introduction and History

- National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST) regulates standardization in the US
- DES is an aging standard that no longer meets today's needs for strong encryption
- Triple-DES: Endorsed by NIST as a "de facto" standard
- AES: Advanced Encryption Standard
  - Finalized in 2001
  - Goal is to define the Federal Information Processing Standard (FIPS) by selecting a new encryption algorithm suitable for encrypting (non-classified non-military) government documents
  - Candidate algorithms must be:
    - Symmetric-key ciphers supporting 128, 192, and 256 bit keys
    - Royalty-Free
    - Unclassified (i.e. public domain)
    - Available for worldwide export

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# Introduction and History

- AES Round-3 Finalist Algorithms:
  - MARS
    - Candidate offering from IBM Research
  - RC6
    - By Ron Rivest of MIT & RSA Labs, creator of the widely used RC4/RC5 algorithm and "R" in RSA
  - Twofish
    - From Counterpane Internet Security, Inc. (MN)
  - Serpent
    - by Ross Anderson (UK), Eli Biham (ISR) and Lars Knudsen (NO)
  - Rijndael
    - by Joan Daemen and Vincent Rijmen (B)

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
# Rijndael

## The Winner: Rijndael

- Joan Daemen (of Proton World International) and Vincent Rijmen (of Katholieke Universiteit Leuven).
- pronounced "Rhine-doll"
- Allows only 128, 192, and 256-bit key sizes (unlike other candidates)
- Variable input block length: 128, 192, or 256 bits. All nine combinations of key-block length possible.
  - A block is the smallest data size the algorithm will encrypt
- Vast speed improvement over DES in both hw and sw implementations
  - 8,416 bytes/sec on a 20MHz 8051
  - 8.8 Mbytes/sec on a 200MHz Pentium Pro

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# Rijndael




- ◆ Key is expanded to a set of  $n$  round keys
- ◆ Input block  $P$  put thru  $n$  rounds, each with a distinct round sub-key.
- ◆ Strength of algorithm relies on difficulty of obtaining intermediate results (or *state*) of round  $i$  from round  $i+1$  without the round key.

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# Rijndael



- ◆ Each round performs the following operations:
  - ◆ Non-linear Layer: No linear relationship between the input and output of a round
  - ◆ Linear Mixing Layer: Guarantees high diffusion over multiple rounds
    - ◆ Very small correlation between bytes of the round input and the bytes of the output
  - ◆ Key Addition Layer: Bytes of the input are simply XOR'ed with the expanded round key


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# Rijndael

- Three layers provide strength against known types of cryptographic attacks: Rijndael provides "full diffusion" after only two rounds
- Immune to:
  - Linear and differential cryptanalysis
  - Related-key attacks
  - Square attack
  - Interpolation attacks
  - Weak keys
- Rijndael has been "shown" *secure*:
  - No key recovery attacks faster than exhaustive search exist
  - No known symmetry properties in the round mapping
  - No weak keys identified
  - No related-key attacks: No two keys have a high number of expanded round keys in common

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# Rijndael: ByteSub (192)



Each byte at the input of a round undergoes a non-linear byte substitution according to the following transform:

$$\begin{bmatrix} y_0 \\ y_1 \\ y_2 \\ y_3 \\ y_4 \\ y_5 \\ y_6 \\ y_7 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 \\ 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 0 \\ 0 & 0 & 0 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 & 1 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} x_0 \\ x_1 \\ x_2 \\ x_3 \\ x_4 \\ x_5 \\ x_6 \\ x_7 \end{bmatrix} + \begin{bmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 0 \\ 1 \\ 1 \\ 0 \end{bmatrix}$$


Substitution ("S")-box

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# Rijndael: ShiftRow


Nb	C1	C2	C3
4	1	2	3
6	1	2	3
8	1	3	4

Depending on the block length, each "row" of the block is cyclically shifted according to the above table



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# Rijndael: MixColumn



Each column is multiplied by a fixed polynomial  
 $C(x) = '03'*X^3 + '01'*X^2 + '01'*X + '02'$


This corresponds to matrix multiplication  $b(x) = c(x) \otimes a(x)$ :

$$\begin{bmatrix} b_0 \\ b_1 \\ b_2 \\ b_3 \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} 02 & 03 & 01 & 01 \\ 01 & 02 & 03 & 01 \\ 01 & 01 & 02 & 03 \\ 03 & 01 & 01 & 02 \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} a_0 \\ a_1 \\ a_2 \\ a_3 \end{bmatrix}$$

Not xor

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# Rijndael: Key Expansion and Addition



Each word is simply XOR'ed with the expanded round key

Key Expansion algorithm:

```

KeyExpansion(int* Key[4*Nk], int* EKey[Nb*(Nr+1)])
{
    for(i = 0; i < Nk; i++)
        EKey[i] = (Key[4*i], Key[4*i+1], Key[4*i+2], Key[4*i+3]);
    for(i = Nk; i < Nb * (Nr + 1); i++)
    {
        temp = EKey[i - 1];
        if (i % Nk == 0)
            temp = SubByte(RotByte(temp)) ^ Rcon[i / Nk];
        EKey[i] = EKey[i - Nk] ^ temp;
    }
}

```

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# Rijndael: Implementations

- Well-suited for software implementations on 8-bit processors (important for "Smart Cards")
  - Atomic operations focus on bytes and nibbles, not 32- or 64-bit integers
  - Layers such as ByteSub can be efficiently implemented using small tables in ROM (e.g. < 256 bytes).
  - No special instructions are required to speed up operation, e.g. barrel rotates
- For 32-bit implementations:
  - An entire round can be implemented via a fast table lookup routine on machines with 32-bit or higher word lengths
  - Considerable parallelism exists in the algorithm
    - Each layer of Rijndael operates in a parallel manner on the bytes of the round state, all four component transforms act on individual parts of the block
    - Although the Key expansion is complicated and cannot benefit much from parallelism, it only needs to be performed *once* until the two parties switch keys.

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# Rijndael: Implementations

- Hardware Implementations
  - Rijndael performs very well in software, but there are cases when better performance is required (e.g. server and VPN applications).
  - Multiple S-Box engines, round-key XORs, and byte shifts can all be implemented efficiently in hardware when absolute speed is required
  - Small amount of hardware can vastly speed up 8-bit implementations
- Inverse Cipher
  - Except for the non-linear ByteSub step, each part of Rijndael has a straightforward inverse and the operations simply need to be undone in the reverse order.
  - However, Rijndael was specially written so that the same code that encrypts a block can also decrypt the same block simply by changing certain tables and polynomials for each layer. The rest of the operation remains identical.

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## Conclusions and The Future

- Rijndael is an extremely fast, state-of-the-art, highly secure algorithm
- Amenable to efficient implementation in both hw and sw; requires no special instructions to obtain good performance on any computing platform
- Triple-DES, still highly secure and supported by NIST, is expected to be common for the foreseeable future.


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Reminder:  
World's best cipher!

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# One-time pad

For each character:



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## One-time pad (cont.)

- Symmetric
- Pad is selected at **random**
- **Pad is as long as plaintext**
- **Perfectly secure**, but...
- One time only:  
so sending the pad is just as hard as sending the msg

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